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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
9	JOSE GAVINA,	Case No. 5:24-cv-00674-HDV-SHK
11	JOSE GRVIIVI,	Case 110. 3.21 ev 00071 IID v SIIIC
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING AMAZON.COM
13		SERVICES LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS JOSE GAVINA'S
14	v.	AMENDED COMPLAINT [23]
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16	AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC and	
17	DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,	
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19	Defendants.	
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This action arises out of an alleged failure to accommodate a man living with cerebral palsy. As alleged in his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Jose Gavina met with Amazon representatives at a job fair, alerted them to his medical condition, and later received an offer letter for an unspecified job. When Gavina showed up for work on his first day, he learned that he was assigned to a warehousing position. After performing the job for a month, Gavina asserts that he was forced to go on medical leave and was subsequently terminated for absence violations.

This action followed. Gavina asserts four claims, only three of which are in dispute: (1) disability discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a), (2) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(n), and (3) failure to accommodate in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m). <sup>1</sup>

Before the Court is Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Jose Gavina's Amended Complaint ("Motion") [Dkt. No. 23]. Amazon argues in the main that Mr. Gavina has not sufficiently alleged (and cannot allege) that he is a "qualified individual" under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), which would negate an element of all three causes of action. The Court disagrees. Mr. Gavina has adequately and plausibly alleged that he performed the essential functions of the position for a month, and further maintains that he can (and was willing to) perform the same position long term with appropriate accommodations.

Amazon also avers that it did not fail to accommodate or fail to engage in the interactive process, and further maintains that the Complaint does not state a claim for disability discrimination since there are no specific allegations that he was fired *because* of his disability. Motion at 11–14. Again, the Court disagrees. The circumstances surrounding the forced, prolonged leave of absence—partly paid at approximately half his salary—are sufficient to sustain (at least for pleading purposes) a claim for disability discrimination, and the remaining allegations amply support the plausible inference that Amazon failed to accommodate or engage in the interactive process.

<sup>11</sup> Gavina has since withdrawn his fourth claim under the UCL.

Amazon's Motion is therefore denied.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose Gavina was born with cerebral palsy, a permanent condition that affects his back and lower body such that he can only stand and/or walk for thirty-minute intervals and is restricted from frequent lifting and bending. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 20. Gavina attended a job fair in September of 2020, where he interviewed with Defendant Amazon.com Services, LLC ("Amazon") and asked whether it had positions for people with disabilities like his. *Id.* ¶ 19. Amazon responded that it was a "big company" and that it had "many places where [Plaintiff could] work." *Id.* 

In a subsequent interview, an Amazon representative asked Gavina if he had any experience in human resources ("HR"), and Plaintiff answered in the affirmative. *Id.* ¶ 21. Amazon's representatives then informed Gavina that the company had a position for him. *Id.* Although Gavina was not told what the specific position was or what it would involve, he alleges very clearly that he was transparent about his disability throughout the hiring process, and that Amazon assured him that there would not be any issues with his disability. Id ¶ 22.

On September 21, 2020, Gavina received an employment offer via email. *Id.*  $\P$  22. The offer did not include details about the job, including instead only the descriptor "T1." *Id.*  $\P$  23. The onboarding process that followed did not contain any more specific information about the job. *Id.* 

On October 7, 2020, Gavina arrived for his first day of work. *Id.* He purportedly was informed—for the first time—that he would be stocking and sorting merchandise in a warehouse, which required ten-hour shifts of walking, bending, and lifting. *Id.* In need of the income and concerned about the job market during the COVID-19 pandemic, Gavina performed the job through October 30, 2020. *Id.* ¶¶ 24, 30.

At that point, Gavina realized he could no longer do the work without an accommodation and initiated the process to request one. *Id.* ¶ 27. His request to restructure his current position in a way that would accommodate his disability was immediately denied without detailed reasoning. *Id.* ¶ 28. Amazon's "Accommodation Team" instructed Gavina to update his resume, search for job postings

on Amazon's public job board, and submit medical information as requested. *Id.* ¶¶ 28–29. During this time, Gavina was given approximately 55% of his salary as "disability pay." *Id.* ¶ 27. Amazon told him it would also share his resume with other job sites, but warned that if another job was not found by either Amazon or Plaintiff, Amazon would send Gavina a termination letter. *Id.* ¶ 30.

In April 2021, Amazon ended the disability payments. *Id.* ¶ 32. In July 2021, Amazon asked Gavina if he had been able to identify any positions, as they were "coming to an end on the job search." *Id.* ¶ 32.

On April 15, 2022, Gavina received a disciplinary action notice from Amazon informing him that his balance of "Unpaid Time Off" was in the negative, and he was warned that the termination process would begin 48 hours after notice should he fail to respond. *Id.* ¶ 33. Two days later, Gavina received a notice of an "absence violation" stating that he had collected three attendance infractions that could lead to termination. *Id.* ¶ 34. Gavina was fired on April 21, 2022. *Id.* 

#### III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Generally, a court must accept the factual allegations in the pleadings as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Park v. Thompson*, 851 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2017); *Lee v. City of L.A.*, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). But a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). A properly pled complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555.

Only where a plaintiff fails to "nudge[]... [his or her] claims ... across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]" is the complaint properly dismissed. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not a probability assessment, it demands more than "a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Id.* at 678. It is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." *Id.* at 679.

## IV. DISCUSSION

## A. First Claim: Failure to Accommodate

Under California's FEHA, it is "an unlawful employment practice...for an employer...to fail to make a reasonable accommodation for the known physical and mental disability of an applicant or employee [unless the accommodation would produce undue hardship on the employer]." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(m)(1). A "failure to accommodate" claim has three elements: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a "qualified individual"; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability. *Moss v. City and County of S.F.*, 714 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (citation omitted). Amazon argues that Gavina cannot state a claim because the FAC fails to plead the second and third elements.

# 1. Qualified individual

A qualified individual is one that "is able to perform the essential duties of the position [sought or held] with or without reasonable accommodation." *Id.* (citing *Green v. State*, 42 Cal. 4th 254, 267 (2007)). Defendant contends that the FAC fails to plead this element by not identifying what other job was available that Gavina could perform with or without reasonable accommodations. Motion at 6. According to Amazon, the FAC merely asserts that Gavina is qualified for some unspecified human resources work that he has not alleged was even available. *Id.* 

This argument is a strawman that is easily knocked down for at least two reasons. Most obviously, Gavina's claim does not depend on a hypothetical HR position—Gavina alleges that he was capable of performing the position he had as evidenced by the fact that he did so for over a month. FAC ¶¶ 24–27. And second, the FAC alleges that he could perform the essential functions long term with a reasonable accommodation to alleviate his physical limitations. *See, e.g.,* ¶ 23 (Plaintiff could no longer do the job of being "on his feet for ten-hour shifts walking, bending, and lifting" *without a reasonable accommodation*, like providing sitting breaks); *see also* FAC ¶ 20 ("Mr. Gavina can only stand and/or walk for *thirty-minute intervals* and is restricted from *frequent* 

lifting and bending") (emphasis added).<sup>2</sup> That is more than enough to satisfy the low bar for this element at this stage of litigation. *See* 2 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 10003 ("The department shall liberally construe all complaints to effectuate the purpose of the laws the department enforces to safeguard the civil right of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination."); *see also Davis v. Blazin Wings, Inc.*, No. EDCV-16-2167-JGB(KKx), 2016 WL 10966411, at \*8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2016) ("While Plaintiff's pleading burden at this stage is light, he must provide at least some minimal factual basis to support the conclusion that he can perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation for the Court to determine whether his entitlement to relief is plausible.").

# 2. Failure to reasonably accommodate

The third element of this FEHA claim requires that an employer "make reasonable accommodation[s] for the known disability of an employee unless doing so would produce undue hardship to the employer's operation." *Miller v. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab.*, 105 Cal. App. 5th 261, 277 (2024). A "reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to the work environment that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job [] she holds," *Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enter., Inc.*, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2017), and can include "[j]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, [] and other similar accommodations . . . ." *Miller*, 105 Cal. App. 5th at 277.

Amazon does not affirmatively argue that it provided a reasonable accommodation, or that any accommodation would have created an undue hardship. Instead, Amazon fends off Gavina's assertions that placement on disability leave and Amazon's failure to find a different position for him are examples of Amazon's failure to accommodate. Motion at 9 ("Here, Plaintiff cannot base a failure-to-accommodate claim purely on allegations that Amazon placed him on a leave of absence after he reported that he could no longer safely perform his position."); Motion at 10 ("[failing to find a different position for him] may have been an understandably disappointing outcome for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> To be sure, Amazon had (at least at one point) believed Plaintiff is a qualified individual, *i.e.*, could perform the essential functions of the job he was hired for, given that they hired him after he disclosed his disability. FAC ¶ 22.

Plaintiff, but without more, it doesn't support a claim that there was a breakdown in the accommodation process.") But once Amazon was made aware of Plaintiff's disability, it was Amazon's burden to take *positive* steps to accommodate the employee's limitations. *Brown v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.*, 60 Cal. App. 5th 1092, 1108 (2021).<sup>3</sup>

To the extent that Amazon argues that the leave of absence itself was a reasonable accommodation, the law is against it. *Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 85 Cal.App.4th 245, 264 (2000) ("A temporary position is not, however, a reasonable accommodation. It represents, like unpaid leave, a way to put a disabled employee on hold while the attempt to locate a permanent position is ongoing."). Amazon correctly recites that providing a leave of absence may be a reasonable accommodation where an employee can no longer perform the essential functions of the job, *but only if* it is likely that the leave is effective in allowing the employee to return to work at the end of the leave, with or without further reasonable accommodation. Cal. Code Regs. Tit.2 § 11068(c) (emphasis added); *Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District*, 59 Cal. App. 5th 82, 88 (2020) ("A finite leave of absence also *may* be a reasonable accommodation [*if it*] allow[s] an employee time to recover.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted). And here, the FAC alleges that Amazon made no efforts whatsoever to accommodate Gavina's work tasks to allow him to continue in his position. FAC ¶ 28. Thus, on the facts as alleged, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the leave itself would allow Gavina to return to work.<sup>4</sup>

Amazon also argues that it was relieved from the affirmative duty to search for a vacant position because there were no vacant positions available. Motion at 10 (citing *Chisolm v. 7-Eleven, Inc.*, 814 F. App'x 194, 196 (9th Cir. 2020)). But both *Chisolm* and the case it relies on for this rule, *Spitzer v. The Good Guys, Inc.*, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1376 (2000), are decisions based on the sufficiency of the evidence produced by defendants on summary judgment. Amazon will have an opportunity to introduce evidence that there were no vacant positions that Plaintiff was qualified for. But at this stage, the allegations—analyzed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and drawing all favorable inferences therefrom—demand the plausible inference that there *was* a vacant position for which Plaintiff was qualified. Indeed, this is further supported by the allegation that Amazon made representations to Gavina telling him they will "look into getting him a different position" and then telling him not to worry and that "everything will get taken care of." FAC ¶¶ 24–25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The cases Amazon cites on this point are inapposite. Motion at 9 (citing *Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n*, 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) and *Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc.*, 74 Cal. App. 4th 215 (1999)). In *Humphrey*, the Ninth Circuit held a leave of absence could be a reasonable

# B. Second Claim: Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Under FEHA, it is an "unlawful employment practice...for an employer...to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for a reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(n). FEHA obliges employers to continuously engage in "communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual employees with the goal of identifying an accommodation that allows the employee to perform his job effectively." Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 800 (N.D. Cal. 2015). At the pleading stage, Plaintiff is not required to identify a specific reasonable accommodation "that would have been available at the time the interactive process should have occurred," id. (citing Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, 234 Cal. App. 4th 359, 379 (2015)), because "employees do not have at their disposal the extensive information concerning possible alternative positions or possible accommodations which employers have." Id. (citing Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1018 (2009)). In cases where some process is alleged, the Court's ultimate role is to "isolate the cause of the breakdown in the interactive process and then assign responsibility." Alejandro v. ST Micro Elecs., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 850, 863 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citation omitted).

Amazon argues that it did indeed—by Plaintiff's own admission—participate in the interactive process. Motion at 12–13.<sup>5</sup> And Amazon is right that it did engage in some interactive

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accommodation because a doctor opined that the plaintiff could get her condition under control after time off. 239 F.3d at 1136. Similarly, in *Hanson*, the state court found that a leave of sixteen months was a reasonable accommodation where the plaintiff was recuperating from a broken wrist and injured hand. 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 226–27 (1999). But Gavina's cerebral palsy requires a much different set of accommodations. The problem with the "ten-hour shifts walking, bending, and lifting," FAC ¶ 23, is that "Mr. Gavina can only stand and/or walk for thirty-minute intervals and is restricted from frequent lifting and bending" due to the "permanent condition" of cerebral palsy. FAC ¶ 20. Amazon cannot argue that time away from work will alleviate these issues. Some accommodation is necessary.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Amazon also reasserts its argument that Plaintiff is not a qualified individual. The Court disagrees for the same reasons discussed *supra* Part IV.A.1.

process. See FAC ¶ 28–31. But whether Amazon fulfilled its duty is a factual question that requires more than just box-checking. The duty to engage is a "continuing duty and the fact that the employer took some steps to identify a reasonable accommodation does not absolve the employer of liability for failure to engage in the interactive process if it is responsible for a later breakdown in the process." Zamora v. Sec. Indus. Specialists, Inc., 71 Cal. App. 5th 1, 41 (2021). Therefore, on these facts as alleged, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Amazon complied with all of its obligations. Gavina alleges that he kept Amazon apprised of his disability through regular notes from his physician and—after months of no accommodation—asked that his request be elevated. FAC ¶ 31. Gavina further asserts that, despite all of this communication on his end, Amazon informed him that they were coming to an end on the job search despite little if no activity. Id. ¶ 32. Indeed, this communication in July 2021 was the last communication made before he received a notice of disciplinary action on April 15, 2022 advising him that he had overdrawn from his unpaid time off. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Stated differently, Amazon is alleged to have broken the almost year-long silence only to inform him that he was out of leave, and proceeded to fire him a week later. Id. ¶ 35. Accepting the allegations of the FAC as true, as the Court must for purposes of this Motion, dismissal of this claim is far from warranted.

# C. Third Claim: Disability Discrimination

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Under FEHA, it is an "unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer, because of the...physical disability [or] mental disability . . . to bar or discharge the person from employment...or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) that Plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) that Plaintiff is a qualified individual; (3) and that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. *Cable v. Starbucks Corp.*, 664 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1022–23 (C.D. Cal. 2023). An adverse employment action is an action that "materially affected terms and conditions of employment, with that term being construed liberally in order to afford employees appropriate and generous protection against employment discrimination." *Cervantes v. Transdev Servs., Inc.*, No. 3:20-cv-02528-AJB-KSC, 2021 WL 5513512, at \*3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4,

2021) (quotations omitted). The disability "need not be the but-for cause of the adverse employment action, but must be a 'substantial factor motivating' it." *Cable*, 664 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 (citing *Harris v. City of Santa Monica*, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 225 (2013)).

Amazon argues that Plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that he was terminated due to his disability. Motion at 14. As a an initial matter, Plaintiff need only allege that he suffered a cognizable "adverse employment action"—not necessarily termination—and the unpublished Ninth Circuit decision cited by Amazon confirms its own misunderstanding. Eshaya v. Boeing Co., 118 Fed. App'x. 159, 160 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Additionally, [plaintiff] did not suffer an adverse employment action. Assuming, as [plaintiff] avers, that a threat to terminate would suffice to establish an adverse employment action for purposes of disability discrimination, there is no evidence that [defendant] threatened to terminate him."). An unpaid leave of absence can constitute an adverse employment action if it was unreasonable under the circumstances. See Cervantes, 2021 WL 5513512 at \*5. And requiring an employee to take leave when he/she can work with a reasonable accommodation constitutes an adverse employment action. Rizvanovic v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2024 WL 1886495, at \*5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2024).

In light of these authorities and the pleading in question, the Court concludes that Gavina has sufficiently alleged that he could perform his job with a reasonable accommodation (like restructuring the role, FAC ¶ 28), but was instead left on leave until his termination. FAC ¶¶ 27, 32–34. The claim survives.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amazon's Motion is denied.

Dated: December 4, 2024

Hernán D. Vera United States <u>District I</u>udge

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Amazon also reasserts its argument that Plaintiff is not a qualified individual. The Court disagrees for the same reasons discussed *supra* Part IV.A.1.